Ketchell Begs the Question...But He Begs It Well.

Ketchell’s paper is thought-provoking and interesting in the same way that “Fahrenheit 9/11" by Michael Moore is thought-provoking and interesting. What it does, is attack the established “slant” on things by providing another slant that we are not used to seeing. At the outset of his article, Ketchell attacks other documentation of what religion in the US for their abuse of the “slippery definitional issues surrounding the term religion.” By this he means that they have the bias that religion is confined to “a bastion of belief removed from the conditions of everyday life.”. He then points out that this “overlooks the functional aspects of religious practice and their multifarious manifestations in social arenas marked as ‘profane.’” Which is, by all means true; however he then pulls a Michael Moore, and immediately takes the opposite slant: that there is some more secular definition to religion such that whenever its moral code is present so is the religion. (That may be an over-simplification of his views, but at any rate, he does immediately slant on other “slippery definitional issues surrounding the term religion”.)
So, I find his views, (like I find Michael Moore’s) refreshing, and challenging. Especially since we are used to seeing things from the other side of the table. However, one needs to step back and realize that the issue at hand is still unresolved: wether or not these things are religious, and where that “slippery definition” can be tacked down. So, I tip my hat to Ketchell for taking a different and refreshing slant, but at the same time I must recognize it AS A SLANT. It is in its own ways as flawed as the views he is trying to attack. Simply put: he begs the question. (Which is a logical fallacy). But, at the same time, it is a question well begged. . . by this I mean, it is a question that needed to be begged, so we can better realize the argument at hand.

Gleason Doesn't Have Much of an Argument Either

Gleason does a good job of showing the history, significance, and controversies associated with the “melting pot” in all of the ways it has meaning (especially as a symbol). However, I find his concluding arguments all too quick and dirty. He simply states merits (which do not conclusively lead to superiority...for even the worst scum can have merits) and then he very quickly compares them to some of the alternatives. Firstly, he doesn’t show why any of the things he purports as merits of the melting pot are necessary as such for an effective symbol. Furthermore, I don’t think he gives any of his comparisons the full weight he needs to for a convincing argument, and is all too quick to write them off. Especially the metaphor about stew, which I do not see any justification for his claim that it is“not convey[ing] a melting pot sense of an ever-changing process”. Is not a stew always changing? ...and HOW is a melting pot always changing in a way that a stew does not? It seems to me, rather, a melting pot is just a stew of metals. The advantage of the stew symbol, is that a metal stew has no distinct and separate parts after it has been cooked. I also do not see how he finds the stew suggesting more of a chef, than a melting pot a metal miner. I also question the implications that the melting pot brings with it a “receptiveness to immigrants and the CULTURAL VALUES they bring.” Especially because he refers to its having this virtue in its established representation to Americans, when he has shown himself that the established representation of the melting pot has implicit disregard for those values. In a footnote, he thinks he has dodged the argument of a tendency towards the sameness of product...but I think he again is too quick to jump to his desired end. Because, he has not addressed at all the fact that his metal stew will have NO DISTINCT AND SEPARATE PARTS...which I find very problematic. All in all, his arguments are shoddy at best. I appreciate his contributions to the understanding of the melting pot symbol...however, I am not convinced that it is the BEST way to think about integration of varied cultures, ideas, and religions.

On Wether or Not Bellah Has an Argument

What we have with Bellah is an interesting and insightful spin on the status of our nation, and the problems that we face. What we don’t have, is what the article purports to be at the beginning, which is an argument “not only that there is such a thing [as civil religion] but that this religion. . . has its own seriousness and integrity.” Bellah, does successfully, I think build a nice comparison between the ideals of our nation, and the problems it faces with that of a religious setting. However, in no way does he show convincing evidence that necessitates thinking about these things in the context of a religion.
Bellah merely assumes that there is such a religion, and then goes about defining its tenants, figureheads, and symbols. He addresses briefly the problem of why we have historically invoked deities in our formal government proceedings, and then continues to explain problems we have had with belief systems of our government in relation to the world. However, rituals and belief systems do not necessitate a religion. Many atheists hold that they believe in love, and habitually brush their teeth every morning. Yet this does not necessarily make them part of a new “love and toothbrushes” religion.
To properly show that what we are dealing with is indeed a religion, is a much harder task than what Bellah has undertaken. I’m not sure what exactly one would have to go through to argue this, but I am certain that only a small shred of it is in Bellah’s article. In fact, it may even be impossible to truly argue the existence of a religion...I don’t know. Regardless, it would be more apt to think of Bellah’s piece as an insightful comparison, or maybe even a thought experiment. As for an argument on the existence of a religion, I think there is a lot to be desired.

The Problem With Reason And Understanding

Although last class we were focused mainly on the two personal accounts of varied religious experience, the introduction and subsequent articles detailing how one should go about approaching such experiences were much more interesting to me. Particularly, I found the problems that arise out of the “emic / etic” distinctions, as well as the “empathetic, explanatory, agnostic, and postmodernist.” The main question all of these distinctions brought to my mind, was an underlying problem of what type of evidence is valid, and respectively, how one should approach looking at that evidence. I cringe to use the words “valid” and “should” here, as I do not wish to imply that there is a definite answer. (I actually believe in a complex compromise, that I wish not to sort out here. Mainly because I have not fully sorted it out myself.) But the problem remains as to which datum to look at when, and which way to look at it when we are looking at it.
The most perplexing issue of the datum for me, was the problem of empirical data and inductive reasoning. The general introduction shows the problem that with inductive reasoning “one can never be certain wether the next observation will confirm or falsify the claim”. And the problem with empirical data, arises when the “emic” perspective shows that what one gather’s from their experience might not always be the whole picture. What this seems to suggest, (and I would like to see developed arguments on the validity of both of these types of reasoning) is that meaning involves a third type of reason that supercedes empirical evidence and inductive reasoning.
This is problematic, especially for the scientist who believes so firmly in these two conventions to bring meaning to his experiments. As to what exactly that type of reasoning is, I would guess it would be “emic” in nature...but I’m not sure if it can be gathered empirically, (at least in full) or even guessed at inductively (without leaving something out). So what is left? What does this say about the sciences? I cannot put an exact name to what this third type of reasoning would be...if it is reasoning at all. Perhaps the implication is, that in order to fully understand, one has to step outside of reason, and use some other unknown tool entirely. Can one reason their way into understanding things? ...if so, what part of reason should they use if empiricism is incomplete, and inductive unsure?
Logic, does hold a rather tempting vantage point to me at this time. However, parts of logic are reliant on empiricism and inductiveness. But logic is generally a study of the connectives, of the relation between variables and constants and the meanings that can be derived from them. The mind-set of searching for meaningful connectives is I think a good compromise of the emic and the etic approaches. At the same time, I have trouble thinking of a religious practice in terms of a Logical proof (which has a tendency to ignore the meaning of the parts in order to study that of the whole...which may or may not be apt.) Again, there seems to be a part of the picture missing. And it is that part of the picture that disturbs me. Because it means that there is another force that needs to come into play, or, it is simply impossible to reach a true understanding.
Not to mention that the possibility of a true understanding is in itself problematic. But the fact that there are these problems alone, makes me seriously question our tools for understanding, and how much we really understand as a whole. It appears that our understanding, although we purport it to be vast, is in fact dismally short sighted. We have a long way to go.

Why Boyer is Full of It

I have no problems with the premises that Boyer puts forth, especially the idea of falsifying general biases toward religious thinking. However, I do not think he even remotely proves his points or backs his claims. In the short Proudfoot article, which is exemplary of the kind of paper Boyer didn’t write, we see with a sound philosophical argument that when dealing with “Explanatory Reduction” (which is attempted, but no where near achieved by Boyer) that one “must be prepared to give reasons for his ascription of those beliefs and judgements to the subject”. The reason why Boyer falls short, is his reasons for his ascriptions are insufficient.
For instance, there are many times when Boyer states conjecture as fact, failing to provide any real, confirmable, or concrete support. This becomes deceiving to the reader when he then uses those “stated as facts” to form arguments, that appear sound, but that really rely on evidence he pretends to have submitted. This is a common slight of hand with persuasive writing, but it is a logical fallacy and a cheat.
For example, on page five of ten on my printed version, he sites “a systematic investigation of these tacit concepts,” but he never cites the investigators, or even elaborate on what field of investigating is at hand. He simply slides in the language of a “systematic investigation” so that he appears to be credible. Yet I have severe doubts wether or not any investigation has taken place at all. This is no isolated incident, it occurs again with “Developmental research” the second paragraph of the Exchange, Morality and Misfortune section; “Psychological investigation” first paragraph of What Makes Religion “Natural”; “Some evolutionary biologists think...”three paragraphs into the latter; (and then this one is my favorite:) “All this supports what anthropologists have been saying for a long time on the basis of evidence gathered in the most various cultural environments.” And etc. etc.... In all of these cases, Boyer gives no indication of ANY proof of credentials behind these claims. Where it may be that psychological investigations are indeed going on, or that biologists may indeed be thinking one thing or another; it is still necessary for scholarly argument to present at least one verifiable representative of this view point, or one citation of the actual work itself. If these desiderata are not met, it becomes severely questionable as to the factual existence of the claims at stake.
There are also many further examples of unsupported statement “as fact” beyond the realm of simply naming false, or unverifiable credentials. Take for example the un-cited, and unsupported claim on page 6 of 10, that “Moral intuitions appear long before children represent the powers of supernatural agents, they appear in the same way in cultures where no one is much interested in supernatural agents. . .” He has given no study at all to back this claim, and no argument to lead me to believe that this is so. He simply states it as fact, because he finds it convenient for his argument. Further examples of this are: “the first thing to understand about religion is that it does not activate one particular capacity in the mind. . .” page 2 of 10; “these combinations of explicit violation and tacit inferences are culturally widespread and may constitute a memory optimum.” page 5 of 10; Don’t even get me started on the suspicious “Religious Brain Map” on page 3 of 10.
It is evident to me that Boyer prefers subtle tricks of rhetoric, and deception to factual methods of proof and argument. There is little if any well grounded support for his article. Does it bother anyone else that the second sited source doesn’t appear until page 5? (Even then it is very ambiguous how much material in the paragraph is referable to the citation.) Not to mention that the few parts cited are rarely crucial focal points of Boyer’s arguments, but simply background information he uses to twist as he pleases.

A Short Opinion About Religious "Diversity" In The Media

Religious Diversity in the Media is something that concerns me. Mostly because it tends not to be presented objectively at all. There is a disturbing tendency in our culture, to present the “other” through an uneducated subjective lense of bias (as pointed out, if not in those exact words, by both the Paden and Yearely articles). The method with which we are often presented with for looking at other cultures, has become sullied with a hasty need for judgement.
This becomes further complicated by a media who feels driven to show conflict, shock, and horror (for increased ratings, and dramatic interest) rather than a more objective, level-headed journalism. Perhaps objectivity, sensibility and true Paden-like comparison might not sell as well as everyone’s favorite subjective thriller of the day; but it is at a sad cost that we give up truth for entertainment.
History shows that people don’t want fairness, equality, or lack of persecution. Instead, they wish to be the one’s who dish it out, instead of take it in. Our fore-fathers escaped persecution in England so they could turn around and start persecuting other people that they saw lesser than themselves instead; people like the Native Americans, other religious denominations that were settling along-side them, and the Salem Witches. As a culture, we would rather draw a line between “us and them” than we would take any steps to understand each other. That’s because it’s easier to have the answers handed to you than it is to figure them out for yourself. People like easy...they pick the path of less resistance. But easy isn’t all that it’s cracked up to be. Easy causes problems like bias. Easy causes problems like labels. Problems like Mohsin was confronting with “Islamic Terrorists”.
The true challenge of comprehending and dealing with religious diversity, is sadly something that is above most elements of our culture (eg. the media). However, in an intellectual setting like ours, there is finally a small place where objectivity can start to break through those biases. We have a large task ahead of us, and the first step is to put down our gavel and pick up our astrolabe.

hi.

::waves::